the president-parliamentary system in 2010 -the constitutional arrangement with the most dismal record of democratisation -was a step in the wrong direction. The premierpresidential regime was by no means ideal, but it had at least two advantages. It weakened the presidential dominance and it explicitly anchored the survival of the government in parliament. The return to the 1996 constitution ties in well with the notion that President Viktor Yanukovych has embarked on an outright authoritarian path.
INTRODUCTION
The last round of the 2010 presidential elections put an abrupt end to Ukraine's Orange Revolution. The undisputed winner was Viktor Yanukovych, the leader of the Party of Regions, whose attempts to steal the previous presidential But the impact of the Orange Revolution was positive in so far as it broke the hybrid deadlock in Ukrainian politics and reinitiated the process of democratisation.
The response of the international community was favourable. Freedom House promptly included Ukraine among the democracies of the world and Ukraine was to defend this unique position within the Russian sphere of influence through the presidential elections of 2010, but this trend was not to be lasting. A year later, Freedom House once again rated Ukraine as only "partly free".
The constitutional framework in hybrid regimes is crucial as an arena where the political incumbents struggle to define and expand their influence. The political opposition has accused the Yanukovych regime of having a secret rollback strategy designed to re-establish the strong presidency of the Kuchma regime -suspicions echoed by international media. The president-parliamentary constitution of 1996 -to which Ukraine returned in 2010 -is of the standard post-Soviet variety with a strong president and a weak parliament. It has a dismal record as an agent of democratisation and many comparativists therefore strongly advise against it. 1 The kind of premier-presidentialism practised under Yushchenko (2006 Yushchenko ( -2010 introduced a division of power strengthening the role of the prime minister and the parliament and weakening that of the president. This paved the way for a more dualistic political system as it explicitly balances between two domains of executive power -one for the president and one for the prime minister. Under the restored constitution of 1996 the prime minister is clearly subordinated to the president and as such it provides for one dominant pillar of executive power.
In this article we set out to analyse recent regime developments in Ukraine in relation to its semi-presidential structure. We ask: to what extent and in what ways
SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM: DEFINITION AND THEORETICAL

ARGUMENTS
Ukraine was by no means the only post-Soviet state to adopt a semipresidential system with a strong presidency after independence. With the exception of Turkmenistan (presidential), Estonia, and Latvia (parliamentary), semi-presidential constitutions were in fact installed throughout the former Soviet . Semi-presidentialism came about almost by default and as a natural bargaining outcome, as it represents a compromise between pure parliamentarism and pure presidentialism. It also offers a level of flexibility and scope for negotiation over the relative powers of president, prime minister and parliament. 3 Semi-presidentialism of the variety known as president-parliamentary 4 was the preferred choice of the vast majority of former Soviet republics, including
Ukraine. 5 Applying a strictly constitutional definition of semi-presidentialism 6 5 Already before the formal declaration of Ukrainian independence (August 1991), a presidency was created (July 1991). The rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union and the shift of power to the republics inspired the creation of a presidential institution, as it was hoped that a presidency would enhance the strengthening of the institutional resources and the self-governing capacity of the Ukrainian republic. 6 A quite substantial literature has been devoted to the concept of semi-presidentialism and the classical definition by Maurice Duverger (1980) we define a president-parliamentary system as a system where (1) the president is elected by a popular vote for a fixed term in office; (2) the president appoints and dismisses the prime minister and other cabinet ministers; (3) the prime minister and cabinet ministers are subjected to parliamentary as well as presidential confidence; and (4) the president typically has some legislative powers and the power to dissolve the parliament. Premier-presidentialism prevails where (1) the president is elected by a popular vote for a fixed term in office; (2) the president selects the prime minister who heads the cabinet; but (3) authority to dismiss the cabinet rests exclusively with the parliament. 7 Hence, an important difference between president-parliamentary and premier-presidential systems is that in the former the government is accountable to both the president and the parliament, whereas in premier-presidential systems the government is accountable only to the parliament. In addition, and just as important, president-parliamentary systems are generally characterised by stronger presidential prerogatives.
The Ukrainian constitution of 1996 features the typical characteristics of a president-parliamentary system, including a directly elected president with a first say on cabinet formation and executive matters, and a cabinet subordinated to presidential as well as parliamentary confidence. Less typical, though, the Ukrainian president was not vested with the authority to dissolve the parliament, neither before, nor after the adoption of the 1996 constitution. With the constitutional amendments of 2004, the system shifted towards premier-presidentialism (in force 2006-10). The presidential prerogatives were drastically curtailed and the government was explicitly described as dependent upon parliamentary support alone.
The power balance in favour of the president in the 1996 constitution becomes apparent by considering the formal presidential powers. Shugart and Carey explicitly warned constitution-makers "to stay away from president-parliamentary designs". 18 The arguments against this form of government largely revolve around the dependent and uncertain political position of the government as it is constitutionally "squeezed" between the president and the parliament for its survival. If the president does not have the support of a parliamentary majority, the dual loyalty of the government -to the president and to the parliament -is bound to produce conflict and political stalemate. 19 The president always retains the option to dismiss the prime minister in an attempt to break the political stalemate. But the appointment of a new prime minister candidate requires the support of the parliament and the president may find that the relationship with the new prime minister is just as troublesome, if not more so because of the crisis caused by the dismissal of his or her predecessor. Since both the president and the parliament retain the power to dismiss the government, each institution may calculate that the best way to maximise influence is to work against rather than with the other institution. Such conflicts over appointments and ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 5, NUMBER 1 2012 27 dismissals are likely to lead to conflict over the regime itself. In Elgie's words "under president-parliamentarism the president and the legislature have an incentive to act against each other, which means there is little incentive to maintain the status quo and which in turn generates instability that is likely to undermine democratic performance and, in the worst-case scenario, lead to the collapse of democracy". 20 And indeed, in several president-parliamentary countries in the former Soviet Union, e.g. Belarus, Russia and Uzbekistan, the strong presidential component, introduced from the very beginning, has contributed to legitimising and reinforcing already authoritarian tendencies. As such, the president-parliamentary system has provided a constitutionally sanctioned tool for accumulating power in the hands of presidents who have been less than interested in promoting democratic reforms. Instead of democratisation, the outcome has been increased power of already powerful presidents. A key factor favouring premierpresidentialism over president-parliamentarism is that the former provides the possibility of combining presidential leadership with a government anchored in parliament. Since the president cannot dismiss the government once it has been formed, he or she will have incentives to negotiate with the parliament in order to gain influence over the government and the political process. But again, the arguments presented above concerning the risk and consequences of intraexecutive conflict explain why there are few arguments in favour of premierpresidentialism over parliamentarism.
UKRAINE AS A HYBRID REGIME
Before we address the institutional tug of war in Ukraine in relation to semipresidentialism, we need to place the regime in its post-Soviet context. We consider Ukraine a hybrid regime moving along the continuum between democracy and authoritarianism. Levitsky & Way use the term "electoral authoritarianism" for these regimes in which elections are the principal means for acquiring power but where "incumbents routinely abuse state resources, deny the opposition adequate media coverage, harass opposition candidates and their supporters, and in some cases manipulate electoral results". 21 Hybrid regimes are inherently unstable and may eventually tilt either way -towards democracy or authoritarian rule. 22 There is no linear progression towards democracy; and it is perfectly possible for a hybrid regime to "freeze" somewhere in-between democratic and authoritarian rule for a 20 They all became independent and committed themselves to competitive pluralism almost by default, when the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1990-91, but they did not have the backing of a vital civil society, a burgeoning tradition of the rule of law, or, for that matter, the benevolent support of the European Union like Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and other East European enlargement countries. 25 It was therefore relatively easy for the local political elites -most of whom had roots in the Soviet nomenklatura system -to halt or reverse the process of democratisation, once they had overcome the initial shock over the breakdown of the old world order. 28 Georgia will not have reached that far until President Mikheil Saakashvili has completed his current second term in office. 29 In addition, the Yushchenko era produced a climate where power and authority could be critically questioned in a variety of independent media. The political system that Yushchenko left to his successor in 2010 was still rather dysfunctional, but it was a political system where power and authority could be questioned and where the media had become highly pluralistic. 30 The message of the new administration in Kyiv 2010 was one of business as usual and continuity rather than radical change. Yanukovych chose Brussels as his first foreign destination as president, thus reconfirming Ukraine's commitment to European integration. Membership is not on the agenda, but Ukraine is part of EU's European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and thus qualifies for just about everything the EU has to offer its neighbours but common institutions. 31 Yanukovych's subsequent trip to Moscow did spell change, but not radical change. It rather served to normalise relations between Ukraine and Russia. The deal he worked out 26 The Tulip revolution actually produced more of the same repression and electoral fraud that had brought the new regime to power; and in April 2010 its leader, President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, was forced to flee the country in the midst of a political upheaval. 27 Samuel P. 
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The local elections on 31 October 2010 may be dismissed in similar terms.
Ukrainian authorities did issue invitations to international organisations to monitor the elections but too late for an OSCE mission or other large observer groups to be sent to Ukraine. 35 The only systematic, long-term and large-scale observation conducted was that of the US-funded Ukrainian civil network OPORA. Its reports strongly suggest that the elections were neither free, nor fair -an impression corroborated by short-term observation missions present on the day of the election, independent journalists and numerous official complaints launched by the opposition. The deviations from standard democratic electoral practices were in fact so numerous and so fundamental that the October elections could serve as a manual for how to steal a supposedly democratic election. The rules of the game were changed on short notice. One half of the deputies were to be elected by 
PREMIER-PRESIDENTIAL CONFLICTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC REGIME DIRECTION 2004-10
The legacy of Kuchma's regime continued to cast its shadow on the postOrange period. Not only did the complex system of corrupt patronage remain largely intact; the institutional tug of war was also carried over into the Yushchenko era and even intensified. The institutional rivalry and the inability to deal with necessary reforms had a detrimental effect on the regime as it caused widespread disillusionment within society at large. The lack of a constitutional mechanism for regulating the division of labour between the president and the prime minister resulted in recurrent political crises. appoint the prime minister, and was instead called upon to present a candidate for this office to be confirmed by the parliament. 46 Even more crucial, the president lost the power to dismiss the prime minister. 47 On the other hand, the amendments opened up new possibilities for the president to dissolve the parliament. If the plenary meeting of the parliament does not start working within thirty days after the beginning of the regular session and if the parliament is unable to form a majority coalition with more than 226 out of 450 deputies, the president is entitled to dissolve parliament. 48 At the same time, the powers of the prime minister remained relatively stable. The prime minister retained the right to appoint candidates for the cabinet, though the authority to approve them shifted from the president to the parliament. 49 It is clear that the underlying motives were to move power from the executive (president and prime minister) to the legislative 44 Charles R. Unable to rely on party support, President Yushchenko had to rely on his constitutional powers and on the presidential office itself. 57 Hence, with the key actors using considerable institutional leverage to obstruct durable inter-party collaboration, one can indeed argue that the premier-presidential arrangement contributed to ineffective government and, in the longer run, regime instability.
Nonetheless and despite all these problems, the hybrid regime steered in a generally democratic direction throughout the Yushchenko era. the potential for intra-executive conflict; nevertheless, for a hybrid regime like Ukraine premier-presidentialism is definitely a step in the right direction.
There is no consensus about the rules of the game in Ukrainian politics. The constitution and the electoral law have been subject to recurrent modifications, changing the thrust of the entire political system. The underlying motives are clearly instrumental. Where you sit in the Ukrainian political hierarchy determines where you stand on constitutional reform. Presidents want a strong presidency and prime ministers a stronger parliament; but once catapulted into the presidency, a former prime minister may very well change his constitutional priorities. In this respect, the two semi-presidential arrangements in Ukraine since 1996 have had a negative impact by exacerbating rather than mitigating inter-institutional rivalry. As Sarah Birch argues, constitutional reforms have "tended to follow rather than govern the de facto balance of power". 61 The Rather than simply being contests to determine who is to govern, elections are still events with the potential of altering the whole constitutional structure. Tampering with the rules rather than playing by the rules still seems to be the rule in Ukrainian politics.
The post-communist countries with the strongest presidencies do after all have the most dismal records in terms of democratisation. The return to presidentparliamentary rule in the wake of the presidential elections of 2010 represents a step in the wrong direction for Ukraine -not towards but away from democracy.
